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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW NOTICE
PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES BY SECTION 506(b)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
With increasing frequency, bankruptcy courts are facing the ques-
tion of the effect of state law on an oversecured creditor's application for
attorneys' fees pursuant to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.I The
issue arises most visibly in those states that have passed statutes that
limit a creditor's ability to recover attorneys' fees even when contractual
provisions entitle the creditor to attorneys' fees if forced to take action to
collect the note. A few states refuse to recognize attorneys' fees obliga-
tions in promissory notes, declaring them void and unenforceable. 2
However, most state laws restricting the availability of attorneys' fees
take the form of notice statutes, which require a creditor to provide a
certain number of days' notice of its intent to enforce the attorneys' fees
clause before the clause will be held valid.3
1. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
2. Statutes in two states declare contractual attorneys' fees provisions in bonds, notes, mort-
gages, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt void and unenforceable on policy grounds. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2312 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (1974). These statutes have been
severely criticized, see Note, Recovery of Attorney Fees in Kansas, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 543-45
(1979), and have been dismissed as anachronistic by some courts, see, eg., In re American Metals
Corp., 31 Bankr. 229, 234 & n.1 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). However, both statutes have recently been
upheld by state courts. See Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Maixner, 376 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (N.D. 1985);
Iola State Bank v. Biggs, 233 Kan. 450, 459-64, 662 P.2d 563, 572-75 (1983). Whatever their contin-
uing vitality, this note does not directly address the question whether these statutes should be pre-
empted in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.
3. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2(5) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
The holder of... any other such security agreement which evidences both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods, or his attorney at law, shall,
after maturity of the obligation by default or otherwise, notify the... party sought to be
held on said obligation that the provisions relative to payment of attorneys' fees in addition
to the "outstanding balance" shall be enforced and that such... party sought to be held on
said obligation has five days from the mailing of such notice to pay the "outstanding bal-
ance" without the attorneys' fees. If such party shall pay the "outstanding balance" in full
before the expiration of such time, then the obligation to pay the attorneys' fees shall be
void, and no court shall enforce such provisions.
Several other states have some form of statutory notice requirement that must be satisfied before a
creditor may rightfully collect the attorneys' fees provided for in its contract with the debtor. Geor-
gia's notice statute is very similar to North Carolina's, except that it requires ten days' notice of
intent to collect fees. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-11(a) (1982). The new Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code adopts a thirty-day notice requirement. See TEx. Civ. PaAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.002 (Vernon 1986). New Jersey provides that attorneys' fees clauses in a note are void unless
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Before the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it was well
settled that state law determined the validity of an attorneys' fees agree-
ment contained in a promissory note, even in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding.4 Since 1978, however, it has been uncertain whether the
Bankruptcy Code effected a change in the pre-existing law. This confu-
sion is attributed in part to the language of section 506(b) of the Code-
providing an oversecured creditor the right to collect interest and fees
where the underlying agreement provides for their recovery5-which
does not clearly address the role of state law in determining the validity
of attorneys' fees agreements in bankruptcy.6
The lower federal courts have split on the issue. A slight majority of
the decisions rendered under the new Bankruptcy Code have recognized
or held that an oversecured creditor may obtain attorneys' fees under
section 506(b) notwithstanding contrary state law.7 Such holdings effec-
tively preempt state attorneys' fee laws in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. The slight minority of the decisions, however, have recog-
nized or held that state law must continue to govern the validity of attor-
neys' fee agreements in bankruptcy." Only one circuit court of appeals
has examined the effect of section 506(b) on state law notice provisions.9
the borrower receives fifteen days' notice of intent to sue upon the note. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:11A-53 (West 1984). Mississippi permits recovery of attorneys' fees only where a demand is
made thirty days before filing suit. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-53-81 (Supp. 1985). Numerous
states provide for notice or demand requirements in order to collect attorneys' fees incurred in the
collection of small claims. See, eg., IDAHO CODE § 12-120(1) (1979); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20.080(1) (1983).
4. See, eg., Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928); In re Morris, 602
F.2d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 1979); ITT-Indus. Credit Co. v. Hughes, 594 F.2d 384, 386-88 (4th Cir.
1979); In re Bain, 527 F.2d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Atlanta Int'l Raceway, Inc., 513 F.2d 546,
548 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Cipriano, 8 Bankr. 697, 698 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981); In re Ruck, 4 Bankr.
194, 195 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980). See also Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 448
(1935) ("mhat a party is obliged to go into a federal court of equity to enforce an essentially legal
right arising upon a contract valid.., under controlling state law does not authorize that court to
modify or ignore the terms of the legal obligation upon the claim.").
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. II 1984).
6. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
7. See In re 268 Limited, No. 84-2837, slip. op. at 4 (9th Cir. May 5, 1986); In re Berry
Estates, Inc., 47 Bankr. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Longwell v. Banco Mortgage Co., 38 Bankr.
709, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Scarboro & Garnto, 13 Bankr. 439, 442 (M.D. Ga. 1981); In re
Rausch, 41 Bankr. 833, 834 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984); In re Schlecht, 36 Bankr. 236, 238-40 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1983); In re American Metals Corp., 31 Bankr. 229, 234-35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re
Elmwood Farm, Inc., 19 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Carey, 8 Bankr. 1000, 1002-
04 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Smith, 4 Bankr. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
8. See In re Triangle Equip. Co., 26 Bankr. 175, 177-78 (W.D. Va. 1982); In re Dawson, 32
Bankr. 179, 180 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Banks, 31 Bankr. 173, 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982);
In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); In re Dye Master Realty, Inc.,
15 Bankr. 932, 935-36 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981); In re Sholos, 11 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1981).
9. See Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
This note provides a framework for courts and attorneys faced with
the issue whether section 506(b) preempts state law notice provisions.
The note studies the language and legislative history of section 506(b),
pointing out the inconsistencies and ambiguities that make it difficult to
determine congressional intent. 10 The note then surveys the various ra-
tionales advanced by the lower courts in resolving this issue. Using the
recent Fourth Circuit case of Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Walter
E. Heller & Co." to illustrate several of these rationales, the note sug-
gests that a more consistent approach to this issue is needed.' 2 After
examining the legislative history of section 506(b) in light of federal pre-
emption doctrine,13 and concluding that contradictory inferences arising
from the legislative history preclude an unequivocal determination of
congressional intent to preempt state law under 506(b),14 the note argues
that such a determination is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that
state law notice provisions should be preempted under section 506(b).
Rather, since state law notice statutes serve 1o provide no meaningful
protection to the bankrupt debtor, while creating a procedural burden on
the bankruptcy courts and a financial burden on the bankruptcy estate,
the state statutes should be preempted in bankruptcy because they inter-
fere with the accomplishment of the policy goals that underlie the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' 5
I. THE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND SECTION 506(b)
The steady growth in consumer and business bankruptcies during
the 1960's and early 1970's led to a series of legislative proposals urging a
comprehensive revision of federal bankruptcy law that culminated in
1978 when H.R. 820016 was enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
That bill and its Senate companion, S. 2266,17 were designed to create a
more efficient procedure for the administration of bankruptcies within a
In In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit allowed the recovery of late charges by an oversecured creditor pursuant to
section 506(b). The court noted that such charges were recoverable under Indiana law and that it
therefore would have no ground for denying the creditor recovery of the charges. Id. at 333 & n.8.
The court did not, however, explicitly address the question whether Indiana law was preempted by
section 506(b). Id at 333.
10. See infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text.
11. 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
12. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
16. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
17. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
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modernized federal bankruptcy court system. 18 No fewer than six pro-
posed bills preceded H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 during prior sessions of Con-
gress.19 These earlier attempts at revision, however, did not include a
provision comparable to section 506(b). 20
A. The Language of Section 506(b).
Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the determination of
the secured status of a creditor's claim. Subsection (b), which did not
have a counterpart in the former Bankruptcy Act, addresses the availa-
bility of interest and fees to an oversecured claimant:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,
is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such
claim arose.21
Clearly, the language of section 506(b) does not resolve the question
whether state law is applicable in determining the validity of contractual
attorneys' fees clauses. Because the statute does not explicitly address
the question whether section 506(b) supplants state law, courts have
reached a variety of conclusions. 22
18. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5787, 5788-89.
19. In the ninety-fourth Congress, Representative Edwards, who served as House floor man-
ager for H.R. 8200, introduced the proposed statute of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States as H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975), and also introduced the competing propo-
sal of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges as H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963,
5964; Senator Burdick introduced these two proposals in the Senate as S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), respectively.
During extensive hearings, the constitutionality of the proposals was questioned because they
provided for bankruptcy judges who would not have life tenure pursuant to article III. See Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1943, 2034, 2081-84 (1978) (statement of William T.
Plumb, Jr., consultant to the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States). This constitu-
tional concern prompted further congressional study on the constitutionality of the proposed bank-
ruptcy revision. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941,
945 (1979). The study led to the formulation of a new bill, H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
which Representative Edwards introduced in the House in January 1977. After markup, the com-
mittee compiled all of its changes into an amendment in the nature of a substitute, H.R. 7330, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). After revision, H.R. 7330 became H.R. 8200. See Klee, supra, at 945-47.
20. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TABLE OF DERIVATION OF H.R. 8200, at 8 (Comm.
Print 1977).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
22. See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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B. The Legislative History of Section 506(b).
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code-and particularly of
section 506(b)-does not remove all doubt concerning the preemptive
effect of section 506(b). H.R. 8200 emerged from the House Judiciary
Committee on September 8, 1977. At that time, section 506(b) read:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,
is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, to the extent collectible under applicable law in-
terest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges pro-
vided under the agreement under which such claim arose.23
In 'the accompanying House report, the Judiciary Committee interpreted
section 506(b) as "codif[ying] current law by entitling a creditor with an
oversecured claim to any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided
under the agreement under which the claim arose."24 Pre-existing case
law established that contractual attorneys' fee provisions were enforcea-
ble in bankruptcy only if valid in accordance with state law.25 Moreover,
the House version of section 506(b) explicitly incorporated state law.
Therefore, one could reasonably infer from the House report that H.R.
8200 would allow an oversecured creditor to recover attorneys' fees
under section 506(b) only where such fees were allowable under state
law.26
Though S. 2266 was a companion bill to H.R. 8200, there were
many differences, one of which involved the language of section 506(b).
When it emerged from committee, the Senate version provided:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property, the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,
23. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(b) (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in App. 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111-1, 387 (15th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
24. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356-57, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6312.
25. See supra note 4.
26. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
H.R. 8200 was first considered by the House on October 27, 1977. See 123 CONG. REc. 35,438
(1977). The next day, Congressman Danielson introduced a controversial amendment designed to
withdraw the article III status of the proposed bankruptcy courts. See id. at 35,673-78. The amend-
ment was adopted, whereupon Congressman Edwards withdrew the bill from further consideration.
See id at 35,692-93.
This activity in the House served to spur action in the Senate, where Senator DeConcini intro-
duced S. 2266 on October 31, 1977. See id. at 36,095. The Senate Judiciary Committee held exten-
sive hearings on S. 2266 during the first session, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.
2266 and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and subsequently incorporated the results of the
hearings into an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2266. This amended version was
subsequently reported out of committee on July 14, 1978. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787.
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is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such
claim arose.27
Unlike the House version of the bill, the Senate version contained no
reference to "applicable [state] law."' 28 It is significant, however, that
despite the absence of this language, the Senate Judiciary Committee in-
terpreted section 506(b) as codifying pre-existing law.29 The Senate in-
terpretation was essentially identical to the House interpretation of H.R.
8200,30 notwithstanding the different language of the two bills. Thus, at
the time the Senate committee filed its report, the reasonable inference of
congressional intent was that under section 506(b) of S. 2266, state law
would continue to determine the validity of the attorneys' fees claims of
oversecured creditors.3 1
After the House voted to approve H.R. 8200,32 the Senate amended
H.R. 8200 by replacing the text of the bill with that of S. 2266 and passed
H.R. 8200, as amended, by voice vote.33 Due perhaps to the lateness of
the session and the fear that prolonged negotiation might jeopardize the
possibility of enacting any bankruptcy legislation during the second ses-
sion, the floor managers apparently decided to forego a formal confer-
ence and instead attempted to resolve the differences by informal
agreement. 34 Congressman Edwards offered an amendment to the Sen-
ate version of the bill, which was passed by consent and returned to the
Senate.35 The Senate concurred in the amendment, offered a final set of
amendments, and returned the package to the House for final passage. 36
A motion to concur in the final Senate amendments passed without ob-
jection in the House, and the bill was sent to the President for approval.37
Throughout the final amendment process, no changes were made in the
27. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 506(b) (1977), reprinted in App. 3 COLLIER, supra note 23,
at VII-1, 394.
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. Subsection (b) codifies current law by entitling a creditor with an oversecured claim to
any reasonable fees (including attorneys' fees), costs, or charges provided under the agree-
ment under which the claim arose. These fees, costs, and charges aare [sic] secured claims
to the extent that the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the underlying claim.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5854.
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
32. See 124 CONG. REc. 1783 (1978).
33. Id. at 28,284.
34. See Klee, supra note 19, at 954; see also 124 CONG. REc. 34,144 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
35. 124 CONG. REc. 32,350-420 (1978).
36. Id. at 33,989-4,019.
37. Id. at 34,143-45.
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text of the Senate version of section 506(b).38
To this point, the legislative history of section 506(b) seems rela-
tively straightforward. However, the floor statements made by Congress-
man Edwards and Senator DeConcini, the managers of the bill, in
reporting the apparent compromise version of H.R. 8200 to their respec-
tive houses of Congress, contradicted the interpretation of section 506(b)
evidenced in both the House and Senate reports. In reporting to the
House, Congressman Edwards stated:
Section 506(b) of the House amendment adopts language contained in
the Senate amendment and rejects language contained in H.R. 8200 as
passed by the House. If the security agreement between the parties
provides for attorneys' fees, it will be enforceable under title II [sic],
notwithstanding contrary law, and is recoverable from the collateral af-
ter any recovery under section 506(c). 39
Senator DeConcini used identical language in reporting H.R. 8200 to the
Senate.4o
These floor statements seem to contemplate the preemption of state
attorneys' fees laws under section 506(b). However, the language of the
Senate version of section 506(b) never changed, and Senator DeConcini
offered no explanation for-or recognition of-the change in interpreta-
tion from the original Senate Judiciary Committee report filed less than
three months earlier.41 The remainder of the legislative record also pro-
vides no explanation for the change in interpretation of the provision.
Because the Senate committee report and the floor statements present
contradictory interpretations of the same language, it is difficult to dis-
cern an unmistakable congressional intent concerning the role of state
law under section 506(b).
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES
Recently, in Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Walter E. Heller &
Co.,42 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed the question whether section 506(b) supplants state attorneys'
fees laws. The procedural history of Heller demonstrates the divergent
judicial approaches to resolving this issue.
38. Compare supra note 21 and accompanying text (present version of section 506(b)) with
supra note 27 and accompanying text (S. 2266 as it emerged from committee). The word "for"
following "provided" was added in a technical amendment in 1984. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 448(a), 98 Stat. 333, 374.
39. 124 CONG. Rac. 32,398 (1978) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 33,997.
41. Compare supra text accompanying note 39 (floor statement) with supra note 29 and accom-
panying text (committee report explaining that section 506(b) codified current law).
42. 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
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The Heller case arose out of the bankruptcy proceedings of the
debtor K.H. Stephenson Supply Co. ("Stephenson"). Stephenson had
executed a promissory note in favor of Walter E. Heller & Co. ("Heller")
that granted Heller a secured interest in Stephenson's inventory and ac-
counts receivable exceeding the face amount of the note. The note also
provided that Heller, as an oversecured creditor, could collect attorneys'
fees up to fifteen percent of the debt.43
After Stephenson petitioned for reorganization, Heller filed a claim
with the United States bankruptcy court under section 506(b), seeking to
recover the attorneys' fees and expenses provided for in the note. The
Unsecured Creditors' Committee objected to an award of attorneys' fees,
asserting that Heller had not complied with the applicable North Caro-
lina law governing the recovery of attorneys' fees.44 The bankruptcy
court overruled this objection and held that notice would have been futile
given Stephenson's inability to repay the debt, and that this futility re-
lieved Heller of its obligation to provide the five-day notice required by
the North Carolina statute.45 On rehearing, however, the bankruptcy
court held that Heller had to comply with the North Carolina statute,
notwithstanding the futility of compliance. Yet the court awarded attor-
neys' fees to Heller, finding that Heller had satisfied the notice require-
ment when it filed its original proof of claim.46
The district court, in reviewing the decision of the bankruptcy court,
determined that Heller, in filing its claim, had not sufficiently complied
with the notice provisions of North Carolina law.47 The court then ex-
amined the legislative history of section 506(b) in order to determine
whether Congress had intended to preempt state law governing the col-
lection of attorneys' fees.48 The court did not find the legislative history
of section 506(b) conclusive.49 Reasoning from the language of section
506(b) and the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, the court con-
cluded that state law governed the validity of attorneys' fees provisions.
43. The note provided that:
Each maker and endorser further agrees, jointly and severally, to pay all costs of collec-
tions, including a reasonable attorney's fee of 15% in case the principal of this note or any
interest thereon is not paid at the respective maturity thereof, or in case it becomes neces-
sary to protect the security thereof, whether suit be brought or not.
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., No. C-82-1282-G, slip op. at 2 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 17, 1984), rev'd, 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
44. Heller, 768 F.2d at 581-82.
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id
47. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., No. C-82-1282-G, slip op. at 18
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 1984), rev'd, 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 7.
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Accordingly, the court denied Heller's petition for attorneys' fees be-
cause it had failed to comply with the five-day notice requirement of
North Carolina law. 50
The Fourth Circuit reversed, remanding to the bankruptcy court for
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to Heller.5 1 The majority opinion,
written by Judge Ervin, indicated that under pre-Bankruptcy Reform
Act case law, state law governed the validity of attorneys' fees agree-
ments.5 2 Finding the words of the statute unhelpful in deciding whether
Congress intended to preempt state law, the court turned to the legisla-
tive history of section 506(b). The court attributed the "confusion" in
the legislative history to the different language of the two bills, 3 but held
that the confusion could be resolved by examining the fate of the House
version of section 506(b).5 4 The court then proceeded to assign determi-
native weight to the floor statements of Congressman Edwards and Sena-
tor DeConcini, which purported to reject the "to the extent collectible
under applicable law" language of the House version.55 The majority
thus concluded that Congress, in rejecting the House version of section
506(b), intended to supplant existing law that upheld attorneys' fees
agreements only if they were valid and enforceable under state law.5 6
Concurring in the result, Judge Widener felt that the bankruptcy court
had correctly decided the case after the first hearing-that state law gov-
erned, but compliance with the state's notice requirement was unneces-
sary because the bankrupt debtor, unable to repay the debt, could not
have avoided litigation even if it had received the notice.57
The various approaches adopted by the judges involved in the Heller
case reflect the lack of judicial consensus in resolving the issue. Some
courts, like the Heller majority, have relied exclusively on the legislative
history of the statute in holding that section 506(b) supplants state law.58
Others have determined that the statute itself provides sufficient evidence
50. Id at 18.
51. Heller, 768 F.2d at 585.
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id at 584.
54. Id at 585.
55. The Heller court initially asserted that it would not automatically give determinative weight
to the floor statements in its search for the legislative intent underlying section 506(b). Id. at 583.
Because these statements are the only evidence in the legislative history that supports the inference
that Congress intended to supplant pre-existing law, however, the court could not have reached its
result without assigning determinative weight to the floor statements.
56. Id. at 585.
57. Id at 585-86.
58. See In re Berry Estates, Inc., 47 Bankr. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Scarboro &
Garnto, 13 Bankr. 439, 442 (M.D. Ga. 1981); In re Schlecht, 36 Bankr. 236, 238-40 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1983); In re Carey, 8 Bankr. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
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of congressional intent to abrogate state law.5 9 A number of courts have
simply stated that section 506(b) allows such fees without any discussion
of whether state law applies, or have relied on citations to other cases in
place of independent analysis.60
Nor have the courts holding that state law is not supplanted by sec-
tion 506(b) applied a uniform approach. The bankruptcy judge in Heller
held that state law governed, and that filing a proof of claim in bank-
ruptcy would satisfy a state law notice provision. 61 The district judge in
Heller relied on the language of section 506(b) in reaching the conclusion
that state law governed attorneys' fees agreements. 62 Some courts have
simply relied on pre-Bankruptcy Reform Act case law for support.63
Others have decided that the statute, legislative history, and existing case
law clearly require the application of state law.64 Finally, one district
court, on the basis of the legislative history, reached the novel conclusion
that if a security agreement provides for attorneys' fees, they are to be
determined in accordance with state law, unless they are not recoverable
under state law, in which case they may be allowed as a matter of federal
law.65
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR PREEMPTION OF STATE
LAW NOTICE PROVISIONS
The variation in approaches employed by the lower federal courts
can perhaps be attributed to the fact that courts have generally failed to
address the issue in terms of preemption doctrine; courts have failed to
ask whether section 506(b) preempts the application of state attorneys'
fees laws in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.66 Under the bank-
59. See Longwell v. Banco Mortgage Co., 38 Bankr. 709, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
60. In re Elmwood Farm, Inc., 19 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Smith, 4
Bankr. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. See In re Triangle Equip. Co., 26 Bankr. 175, 177 (W.D. Va. 1982); In re Dawson, 32
Bankr. 179, 180 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Banks, 31 Bankr. 173, 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982);
In re Dye Master Realty, Inc., 15 Bankr. 932, 935-36 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981).
64. See, e.g., In re Sholos, 11 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
65. In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493, 497 (W.D. Va. 1981). Other courts have cited
this decision as authority for the proposition that state laws govern the validity of fees provisions.
See, eg., In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982).
66. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 506(b)
"preempts" state law governing the availability of attorneys' fees as part of a secured claim and
bankruptcy courts should determine the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys' fees rather than
enforcing a contractual fee provision valid under state law. See In re 268 Limited, No. 84-2837, slip
op. at 4-7 (9th Cir. May 5, 1986). Like the Heller court, the 268 Limited court found the floor
statements to be determinative of Congress's intent to displace state law. Id at 6-7. Despite holding
that section 506(b)preempts state law, the 268 Limited court did not examine section 506(b) in light
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ruptcy clause of the Constitution,67 Congress clearly has the power, if it
so chooses, to preempt state law governing the validity of contractual
attorneys' fees provisions sought to be enforced by oversecured creditors
in bankruptcy courts. 68 Yet the mere fact that Congress could preempt
these state laws does not justify an inference or presumption that it did
so, because "[c]onsideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."'69
This is particularly true where, as in section 506(b), the federal statute
does not facially reflect congressional intent to preempt. The Supreme
Court has frequently declared that "[p]re-emption of state law by federal
statute or regulation is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive rea-
sons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.' "70
Thus, state laws governing the validity of an oversecured creditor's attor-
neys' fees agreement should be preempted only if the legislative history of
section 506(b) unmistakably reflects preemptive intent, or if the nature of
attorneys' fees or the nature of federal bankruptcy regulation is such that
there is no room for state law under section 506(b). Alternatively, sec-
tion 506(b) may preempt state attorneys' fees laws where they "stand as
of the established thresholds for federal preemption-whether congressional intent is unmistakable,
whether Congress has occupied the regulatory field, or whether there is an unavoidable conflict
between the federal and state laws. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
67. Congress has the power "[t]o establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
68. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("The constitutional authority of Con-
gress... would clearly encompass a federal statute defining the mortgagee's interest in the rents and
profits earned by property in a bankrupt estate."); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973)
(congressional power over bankruptcy is plenary and exclusive); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 304 U.S. 502, 518 (1938) ("Property rights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the bank-
ruptcy court because created and protected by state law... . [I]f Congress is acting within its
bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to affect these property rights .... ");
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Congress,
under its Bankruptcy power, certainly has the constitutional prerogative to pre-empt the States, even
in their exercise of police power. .. ."); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.
1983) (where Congress chooses to exercise its bankruptcy power, contrary state laws must give way),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
69. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). See also Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 761 (1984) ("Title 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) provides
additional evidence that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state
laws.").
70. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (quoting
Florida Line & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)); accord Hayfield N.R.R.
Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981);
see also Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Where the traditional police power of the State is deemed to 'be withdrawn by Congress in bank-
ruptcy legislation, evidence of that withdrawal in fit language should be found within the act.' ")
(quoting In re Chicago Rapid Trans. Co., 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942)).
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 71
A. Congressional Intent to Preempt State Law Notice Provisions.
Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, any holding that
Congress unmistakably intended to preempt state law notice provisions
must be founded in an analysis of the legislative history of section 506(b).
Courts that have held that Congress intended to abrogate state law, such
as the Heller court, have relied solely on the legislative history, despite its
ambiguities, without examining other potential bases for that result.72
As discussed previously, the Heller majority attributed the confusion sur-
rounding section 506(b) to the different language used in the original ver-
sion of H.R. 8200.73 The court proceeded to assign determinative weight
to the floor statements,74 concluding that they effectively resolved the
ambiguity caused by the different language of the two bills. 75
A careful analysis of the legislative history, however, suggests that
the resolution is not so simple. Contrary to the analysis of the courts
adopting the Heller rationale, it was the floor statements, not the differ-
ent language of the initial bills, that introduced confusion and inconsis-
tency into the legislative history.76 In construing a statute, a court
should look to determine the probable intent of Congress. 77 At the time
of the filing of the Senate committee report, the intent of both houses had
been clearly expressed by both judiciary committees. Each version of
section 506(b) was interpreted as merely codifying pre-existing law,
71. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (quoting Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); accord Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
72. Critics of the ever-increasing use of legislative history in judicial interpretation of statutes
are frequently most vocal where, as in the case of section 506(b), the legislative history can arguably
be construed to support conflicting inferences. Cf. American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340,
355 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A singularly unhelpful source of information, legislative history always con-
tains self-serving statements that support either side of an argument and most points between.");
Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535,
538 (1948) ("It is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible support in legislative history .... ");
Mangum, Legislative History in the Interpretation of Law: an Illustrative Case Study, 1983 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 281, 304 ("Legislative history is often-perhaps almost always-a weak reed to lean upon in
deciding the meaning of ambiguous statutory language."); Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IoWA L. RPv. 195, 214 (1983) ("It some-
times seems that citing legislative history is... akin to looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends.").
73. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
75. Heller, 768 F.2d at 585.
76. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in a case [calling
for construction of a statute] is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative
will.").
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notwithstanding the different language contained in the two bills.78 Thus,
it is reasonable to suggest that at the time the Senate committee filed its
report there was no confusion to be resolved as to the intent of Congress
in enacting section 506(b). Rather, the confusion began when the floor
statements, in no way reflecting the content of the committee reports,
inexplicably indicated that section 506(b) provided for attorneys' fees
notwithstanding contrary law.79
There is no readily available evidence that explains this inconsis-
tency and apparent change of interpretation. There is no evidence that
the committee members contemplated a federal standard; indeed, the
committee reports suggest otherwise.80 There is no evidence of markup
or any informal changes made after the filing of the committee reports
that might justify or explain such a change. There was no debate con-
cerning section 506(b) during floor consideration of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act. Because there was no formal conference, there is no
conference report that might reflect the reasons for changing the previ-
ously expressed interpretation of section 506(b) (if such a change were
78. See supra notes 24, 29 and accompanying text.
79. The content of the floor statements simply does not follow from a reconstruction of the
history of the Senate version of section 506(b) to that point. The Senate report reflected the Senate's
intent to codify pre-existing law. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The first sentence of the
floor statement recognized that section 506(b) as enacted adopted the Senate version of the bill. See
supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Thus, the logical conclusion from these two statements
would be that the bill as enacted codified pre-existing law. The second sentence of the floor state-
ment, which the Heller court found determinative, does not logically follow from the prior expres-
sion of congressional intent contained in the Senate report.
80. It is untenable to propose that Congress was confused as to the status of the pre-existing law
in this area, as one court argued in holding that section 506(b) establishes a federal standard for the
recovery of attorneys' fees. See In re American Metals Corp., 31 Bankr. 229, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1983). In interpreting federal statutes, a court should presume that Congress knew and understood
the state of the law at the time of the consideration of the statute. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) ("It is always appropriate to assume that our elected repre-
sentatives, like other citizens, know the law .. "); Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435,
449 (1918) ("When Congress passed the act in question the rule of Bailey v. Glover [88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 342 (1874)] was the established doctrine of this court. It was presumably enacted with the
ruling of that case in mind."); United States v. Zappola, 677 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir.) (presuming that
Congress was aware of settled interpretation of state extortion laws), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 866
(1982); International Union of the United Ass'n of Journeyman and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Indus. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Congress knew precisely
what state laws it validated in passing Taft-Hartley Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); United
States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir.) (court can presume that Congress is aware of
settled judicial constructions of existing law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Kansas City v.
Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir.) ("[lit is to be assumed that Congress was aware
of established rules of law applicable to the subject matter of the statute .... "), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
912 (1962).
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intended).81 Furthermore, the legislative history is devoid of any stated
policy considerations that would justify or require a federal standard
under section 506(b). Analyzed in its entirety, the legislative history pro-
vides no conclusive explanation for any change of interpretation.
This is not to suggest that the interpretation of the Heller court is
wholly indefensible. Certainly, the floor statements are explicit, and floor
statements by managers of legislation have generally been considered
worthy of substantial weight in the interpretation of statutes.82 Yet
although these floor statements provide plausible support for a federal
standard under section 506(b), they also create an inconsistency in an
otherwise clear legislative history and provide no explanation for the al-
leged departure from the interpretation contained in the explicit commit-
tee reports.8 3 Therefore, it is also possible to conclude, as have some
81. Indeed, from the similarity of the committee reports concerning the interpretation of sec-
tion 506(b), see supra notes 24, 29 and accompanying text, it appears that there was no difference of
interpretation or intent on which to compromise.
82. Courts have often referred to floor statements of managers of legislation and accorded them
great or determinative weight in statutory interpretation. See, eg., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 63 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S.
427, 437 (1952); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-77 (1921); Mills v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984). These references,
however, have usually been accorded determinative weight only where the committee reports were
not explicit on the disputed issue, see, eg., Duplex, 254 U.S. at 475; where the committee report was
not previously submitted to the committee members, see Chicago, M. St. P. & P.R.R. v. Acme Fast
Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465, 475 (1949); where the provision at issue was introduced by floor amend-
ment and was thus not interpreted in hearings or committee reports, see Lewis, 445 U.S. at 62;
Simpson, 435 U.S. at 13 & n.7; or where the statements were made in response to a question during
debate which specifically addressed the issue to be determined, see Duplex, 254 U.S. at 475; Mills,
713 F.2d at 1252-53. None of these situations is present in the case of section 506(b).
83. An unexplained change in the interpretation of a bill should not be entitled to determinative
weight in construing a statute or the intent of the legislature in enacting it. See Trailmobile Co. v.
Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947) ("T]he most important committee changes relied upon were made
without explanation. The interpretation of statutes cannot safely be made to rest upon mute inter-
mediate legislative maneuvers.") (footnotes omitted); Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469,
474 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Unexplained changes made in committee are not reliable indicators of con-
gressional intent.").
The statements from Trailmobile and Drummond Coal are simply court-stated guidelines for
construction and, of course, do not determine the proper construction of section 506(b). Moreover,
the context is not strictly analogous because the apparent change in the interpretation of section
506(b) occurred outside of committee. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
The underlying premise of Trailmobile, however, suggests that because the alleged change in the
interpretation of section 506(b) occurred outside of committee, the floor statements should not be
treated as unmistakable proof of congressional intent. The changes in Trailmobile and Drummond
Coal were made in committee, see Trailmobile, 331 U.S. at 61; Drummond Coal, 735 F.2d at 474,
where the changes were presumably carefully considered by the committee members. Cf Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (commit-
tee reports "presumably are well considered and carefully prepared"). Still, the courts refused to
accord the unexplained changes determinative interpretive weight. See Trailmobile, 331 U.S. at 61;
Drummond Coal, 735 F.2d at 474. Where, as in the case of section 506(b), the alleged change did
not even occur in committee and there is no other documented explanation, a court should, under
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courts,8 4 that the legislative history does not reflect a congressional intent
to preempt state law in the unmistakable manner that federal preemption
doctrine requires. 85
B. Obstructing the Accomplishment of Objectives Underlying the
Bankruptcy Code.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the legislative history, it is
surprising that courts, in considering section 506(b), have not looked to-
ward one of the alternative rationales for preemption-that state law
may be preempted where it stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 86 An
the analysis of Trailmobile, be hesitant to assign such a "mute intermediate legislative maneuver"
determinative weight in construction.
84. See supra notes 49, 65 and accompanying text.
85. Under federal preemption doctrine, see supra note 70 and accompanying text, "[p]re-emp-
tion of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored... [unless] Congress has unmistaka-
bly so ordained." Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981).
Accord Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 356-57 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
Where legislative history does not unmistakably reflect congressional intent to supersede state law,
courts should be hesitant to rely solely on legislative history in finding that state law is preempted.
For example, in UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), the Supreme Court addressed the issue
whether state jurisdiction over unfair labor practices was preempted by the Taft-Hartley Act and
jurisdiction vested in the National Labor Relations Board. The Court, despite the presence of a
House committee report which explicitly declared that "by the Labor Act Congress pre-empts the
field... insofar as commerce within the meaning of the Act is concerned," see H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947), held that state jurisdiction to award damages resulting from strike
related incidents and activities "cannot fairly be said to be pre-empted without a clearer declaration
of congressional policy than we find here." Russell, 356 U.S. at 646 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the appel-
lees extensively cited legislative history for the proposition that the Federal Work Incentive Program
Act preempted the New York Work Rules as they applied to recipients of federal funds. See Brief of
Appellees at 21-23, 28-31, New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
Despite these voluminous citations, the Court simply quoted one representative statement from the
brief and concluded that it was "ambiguous as to a possible congressional intention to supersede all
state work programs." Dublino, 413 U.S. at 416 (footnote omitted). The court stated that "far more
would be required to show the 'clear manifestation of [congressional] intention' which must exist
before a federal statute is held 'to supersede the exercise' of state action." Id. at 417 (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
See also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1314 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Resort to legislative
materials is not permissible where they are contradictory or ambiguous.") (citing NLRB v. Plas.
terer's Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129 n.24 (1971), which stated that "legislative materials, if
'without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous,' should not, be permitted to control the
customary meaning of words") (quoting United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940)), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
86. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Such a determination typically involves a con-
sideration and comparison of the purposes of the laws or regulatory schemes. See, e.g., In re Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984) (goal of state law-to protect public health by
regulating disposal of toxic wastes-was sufficiently meritorious as not to be preempted by abandon-
ment power granted to trustee by I1 U.S.C. § 554 (1982), even though clean-up of the wastes would
Vol. 1986:176 PREEMPTION UNDER SECTION 506(b) 191
examination of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the ef-
fects of forced compliance with state law notice provisions indicates that
forced compliance has such a deleterious effect on the bankruptcy estate
and the bankruptcy system that state law notice provisions should be
preempted in bankruptcy, where they do not further the underlying state
policies of debtor protection.87 Thus, resort to this branch of preemption
doctrine serves to render a resolution of the tangled legislative history of
section 506(b) unnecessary.
State law notice provisions serve the laudable purpose of protecting
debtors by allowing them one final opportunity to pay their outstanding
debt without incurring attorneys' fees.88 Such statutes are often moti-
vated by the historical distaste of American courts for awarding attor-
neys' fees to litigants.8 9 Certainly, the strong state policies of debtor
protection underlying these statutes should not be ignored in determining
whether state law is preempted by section 506(b).
Because the bankrupt debtor invariably lacks sufficient funds to re-
pay his debt, however, compliance with state law notice provisions tends
to be futile in the bankruptcy context. 90 Where the debtor lacks funds to
repay the debt, the few days' grace provided by the notice statute be-
comes a rather meaningless protection. The maxim that "the law does
result in substantial expenditures that would deplete assets of the bankruptcy estate), aff'd sub nor.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986); Rogers v.
Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 622-26 (3d Cir. 1977) (Virgin Islands job protection statute preempted by
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") despite emphasis in territory's statute on job protection,
because territory's statute emphasized protecting jobs of citizens, and INA emphasized protection of
aliens), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 803 (1978); Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 855-59 (3d Cir.
1975) (New Jersey's "good cause" restriction on franchisor's right to terminate franchise does not
compromise goals of federal scheme of trademark regulation embodied in the Lanham Act and thus
is not preempted).
87. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
88. See, eg., Coastal Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 221, 224, 319
S.E.2d 650, 653 (1984).
89. See, eg., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("In the
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee
from the loser."). The notice statute at issue in Heller has been interpreted as "a far-reaching excep-
tion to the well-established rule against attorney's fees obligations." Reavis v. Ecological Dev., Inc.,
53 N.C. App. 496, 499, 281 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1981); State Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. Allen, 30 N.C.
App. 272, 276, 227 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1976).
90. District Judge Bullock, in his order denying Heller's mqtion for reconsideration, recognized
that the utility of the notice provision was impaired in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding:
"Since debtors will rarely be able to pay their obligation and avoid the imposition of fees, the benefits
flowing from the rule enunciated by this court [requiring compliance with state law] may be largely
formalistic with little substantive benefit to be achieved." Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E.
Heller & Co., No. C-82-1282-G, at 2 (M.D.N.C. May 16, 1984) (order denying motion for
reconsideration).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1986:176
not require doing a vain thing"91 lends some support to the argument
that notice provisions should be preempted in bankruptcy. At least one
court and one leading commentator have cited this futility in concluding
that section 506(b) abrogated pre-existing law.92
Even assuming, however, that futility alone is an insufficient ground
for overriding the strong state policies underlying state notice statutes,
such statutes are particularly onerous in bankruptcy because of their del-
eterious effects on the bankruptcy estate. The filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy triggers the automatic stay provision of section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code.93 The stay, which is extremely broad in scope,
"should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the
debtor or the property of the estate."'94 Because the attorneys' fees of an
oversecured creditor are paid out of the bankruptcy estate, the filing of a
notice of intent to collect attorneys' fees as required by state law is an act
in violation of the automatic stay,95 and the stay prevents the creditor
from giving notice even though notice is required under state law as a
precondition to the collection of fees. As a result, the oversecured credi-
tor is forced to go through the process of filing a motion for relief from
the automatic stay each time it attempts to give notice of intent to collect
attorneys' fees as required by state law.
This additional procedural requirement imposes a substantial bur-
den on the bankruptcy courts and the bankruptcy estate. If compliance
91. This argument was advanced by the creditor, and summarily rejected by the court, in IT'-
Indus. Credit Co. v. Hughes, 594 F.2d 384, 387-88 (4th Cir. 1979).
92. See In re Schlecht, 36 Bankr. 236, 239 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983); 3 COLLIER, supra note 23,
V 506.05, at 506-47. Judge Widener, concurring in Heller, argued that although state law should
generally govern contractual attorneys' fees provisions, notice should have been waived in Heller
because of its futility. Heller, 768 F.2d at 586.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
94. 2 COLLIER, supra note 23, 362.04, at 362-27.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982) (filing of bankruptcy petition stays "any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate"); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982)
(filing of bankruptcy petition stays "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate"). The filing of notice required under state law creates an additional liability upon the
debtor and the bankruptcy estate when the debtor fails to repay the debt, and this seems to fall
within the category of acts proscribed by these sections. Further, filing of notice of intent to collect
attorneys' fees does not fall within the narrow exceptions to the automatic stay elaborated in I 1
U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982).
Courts have held that section 362(a) prevents the giving of notice of intent to collect attorneys'
fees, see, eg., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., No. C-82-1282-G, slip op. at
15 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 1984), rev'd 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985), and other affirmative acts neces-
sary under state law to secure or enforce claims against the debtor, see, eg., In re Murphy, 22 Bankr.
663, 665 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (prohibiting a public trustee from issuing a deed on secured prop-
erty). One commentator has suggested that "[a]s an ordinary rule, the non-debtor party should
when in doubt assume that the stay applies and seek relief by appropriate proceedings in the bank-
ruptcy court." 2 COLLIER, supra note 23, % 362.04, at 362-35.
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with state law notice provisions is required, an oversecured creditor must
satisfy the requirements of a seven step procedure, involving several hear-
ings, to ensure recovery of his attorney's fees.96 If, however, the notice
requirement is preempted by section 506(b), only three procedural steps,
involving only one hearing, are necessary for the creditor to secure his
attorney's fees.97 A seven-step procedure with multiple hearings places
greater burdens on the bankruptcy courts than the more streamlined pro-
cedural approach available if state law notice provisions are preempted in
bankruptcy. Moreover, a growing majority of courts hold that reason-
able attorneys' fees incurred in carrying out each of the necessary proce-
dural steps are compensable.98 As a result, requiring compliance with
the state law notice provision essentially doubles the attorneys' fees ex-
96. The oversecured creditor would (1) file a motion for relief from the automatic stay, see 11
U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982); (2) attend a hearing on the motion for relief from stay, see id; (3) prepare an
order granting relief from stay when granted; (4) file the notice in accordance with state law; (5)
submit an application for attorneys' fees, see 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. II 1984); FED. R. BANxR. P.
2016(a); (6) attend a hearing on the fee application; (7) prepare an order granting fees.
97. The oversecured creditor would (1) submit an application for attorneys' fees, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(b) (Supp. II 1984); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a); (2) attend a hearing on the fee application; (3)
prepare an order granting fees. It would be unnecessary to obtain relief from a stay under this
scenario because the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the filing of the fee application. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(b) (Supp. II 1984); FED. R. BANXR. P. 2016(a).
98. The Ninth Circuit recently held that bankruptcy counsel are entitled to compensation for
the time and effort spent in preparing fee applications:
To require counsel to devote considerable time to the preparation of fee applications, but to
demand that they absorb the substantial cost associated therewith, would be to ignore the
direct mandate of section 330(a) that reasonable compensation be provided for all "actual,
necessary" services rendered by bankruptcy counsel.... We have long required an attor-
ney to file a detailed account of the legal services he provided... in order to recover any
compensation at all for his services. It would be unduly penurious to require such an
accounting without granting reasonable compensation.
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Rose Pass
Mines, Inc. v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis in original). Accord In re
Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 630 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1980); In re G.A.C. Corp., 14 Bankr. 252,
255, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Dominguez, 51 Bankr. 171, 173 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985); In re
Thacker, 48 Bankr. 161, 165 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1985); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 Bankr. 557,
583 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 45 Bankr. 381, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984); In re Tolan, 41 Bankr. 751, 755 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Warrior Drilling & Eng'g
Co., 9 Bankr. 841, 848-49 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981), modified, 18 Bankr. 684 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
While no federal court of appeals has reached a contrary decision in a bankruptcy case, a few bank-
ruptcy courts have held that time spent in preparing a fee application is not compensable out of the
estate. See In re Holthoff, 55 Bankr. 36, 43 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); In re American Metals Corp.,
49 Bankr. 579, 580 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985); In re Trombley, 31 Bankr. 386, 388 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983);
In re Horn & Hardant Baking Co., 30 Bankr. 938, 943 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). Examination of
these opinions, however, indicates that they are devoid of any supporting argument for this holding.
Further, these cases seem contrary to the spirit and the requirements of the bankruptcy rules. Under
the rules, an attorney seeking compensation or reimbursement must provide the court with detailed
statements and records supporting the request for fees. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a). Accurate
and detailed fee applications aid in the proper and expeditious administration of the case and do not
merely serve the self-interest of the petitioning attorney. See, eg., In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47
Bankr. 557, 583 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
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pended in preparing the fee application, 99 further depleting the pool of
assets remaining for potential reorganization or satisfaction of unsecured
creditors. In large bankruptcy proceedings, with sizable numbers of
creditors, these expenses would be further multiplied. This does not
comport with the sound bankruptcy policy of "keeping fees and adminis-
trative expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as
possible for the creditors."10° Finally, because a motion for relief from
the automatic stay to file notice of intent to collect attorneys' fees will
almost certainly be granted, 101 requiring the creditor to go through these
motions to reach a predetermined result unnecessarily accumulates fees
for the sake of form over substance.
Of course, the mere fact that state law procedures are burdensome
does not necessarily render them incompatible with federal bankruptcy
law, or automatically justify their preemption. Where a state law fulfills
its intended purpose, and that purpose is sufficiently weighty to justify
application of state law, a bankruptcy court should not preempt the state
law.10 2 Yet state law notice provisions simply do not give the bankrupt
debtor the protection that they were designed to provide. If, in some
way, the debtor attempts to repay the creditor, such payment is unavail-
99. Compare the requirements of the seven-step procedure, supra note 96, with those of the
three-step procedure, supra note 97.
100. Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974). See also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328
(1966) ("[A] chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to 'secure a prompt and effectual administration
and settlement of the estate .... ") (quotingExparte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312 (1845)).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982) provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annul-
ling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(I) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest ....
If the creditor must comply with the notice provision in order to recover attorneys' fees, yet cannot
comply without violating section 362(a), the creditor's interest is clearly inadequately protected.
The creditor could not take the steps necessary for recovery without receiving relief from the stay,
even though it has a contractual right to recover the fees. Section 361(3) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that adequate protection can be provided, when required, by "granting such other relief...
as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in
such property." II U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982). Granting relief solely to enable the creditor to file the
required notice would be adequate protection of the creditor's interest, and the court can provide
such flexible relief under section 362(d). See 2 COLLIER, supra note 23, 362.07, at 362-49
("[Miodification of the stay may be sufficient to protect the non debtor (sic] party by permitting the
exercise of certain but not all of its rights ...."). No reported case has presented any circumstances
under which a court has denied a motion for relief from stay solely for the purpose of filing notice of
intent to collect attorneys' fees as required by state statute.
102. See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub noan.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
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ing because it is recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee.10 3 Because the
debtor cannot repay the debt voluntarily, without the consent of the
court, it cannot avoid the claim for attorneys' fees while in bankruptcy.
Thus, a state law notice provision fails to serve the one meaningful pur-
pose for which it was designed-protecting the debtor.1°4
Thus, the analysis under this branch of the preemption doctrine
comes down to a balancing of objectives: protection of the debtor-as
promoted by state notice laws, though frustrated by the intervening
bankruptcy-against fairness to the oversecured creditor, efficient ad-
ministration of the estate, and maximization of the estate for reorganiza-
tion or liquidation-as promoted by the Bankruptcy Code. State law
notice requirements provide formal procedural hurdles that merely pro-
duce delay and additional expense to the detriment of all parties involved
in the bankruptcy proceeding. Because these state notice laws do not
provide any meaningful additional protection for the bankrupt debtor,
they should be treated as preempted in the context of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, where they pose an unnecessary burden to creditors, the estate,
and the bankruptcy courts.10 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have recently addressed the question whether section 506(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code supplants state law notice provisions that govern
the validity of contractual attorneys' fees obligations. Unfortunately, the
language of section 506(b) does not expressly answer the question and
the legislative history of the section, though providing plausible support
for the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt state law, contains
significant contradictions and ambiguities. Courts have struggled with
the issue without reaching a consensus. In doing so, courts have not
considered the argument that federal preemption analysis dictates that
state law is preempted if it is incompatible with the federal scheme and is
not supported by strong state policy. Because notice provisions pose an
unnecessary burden to creditors, the estate, and bankruptcy courts and
fail to promote the state's objective of debtor protection, courts should
103. The trustee may avoid transfers of the debtor's property that occur after the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy and are unauthorized by the court or the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 549(a) (1982).
104. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
105. Cf Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983) (in cases of statutory interpre-
tation, task of court is "to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve"); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (same);
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("In expounding a statute, we must... look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
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conclude that state notice provisions are not applicable in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
R. Wilson Freyermuth
